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BAR BRIEFS
It follows, then, that a note may be taken as payment for treasury shares, an exception to the rule as laid down in sec. "4529."
In the case of Nybakken v Baird the syllabus states misleadingly that stock cannot legally be issued before payment of a note
given "in settlement when paid." But the actual holding is not
contra to the Wanner case as again the court really decides
only that a note cannot be considered as payment for stock under
the statute.'
The North Dakota Courts hold, then, that an unsecured note
is property and is good consideration for capital stock, but is not
payment, except for treasury shares. The Court's interpretation
is logical and literal but eviscerates the constitutional and statutory provisions designed to protect stockholders and creditors.
The surest remedy lies in changing the statute. The limiting
definition of "property" excluding the unsecured promissory note
would give to the law the effect which the Legislature undoubtedly intended it to have.
LARRY FOREST,
Law Student,
University of North Dakota.
,56 N. D. 786, 219 N. W. 472 (1928).
4qomp. Laws of N. D. (1913) 1 4529.

EVIDENCE - ADMISSIONS - PRELIMINARY HEARING
ON VOLUNTARY CHARACTER OF ADMISSION NOT
REQUIRED, IN CRIMINAL CASES
From a judgment of conviction for murder in the second degree the defendant appealed, alleging as error the admission in
evidence of a written statement that she had killed her husband
to protect her daughter. The defendant contended that the
statement constituted a confession and had been involuntarily
given, and requested a preliminary hearing as to the voluntary
character of the alleged confession. The court refused the request, but charged the jury to disregard it if they had found it
to have been made under compulsion. Held: That since the
statement was an admission and not a confession, no preliminary
hearing was necessary. State v. Gibson, 284 N. W. 209
(N. D. 1938).
A confession is an acknowledgement in express terms, by a
party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an
admission is a statement by the accused, direct or indirect, of facts
pertinent to the issue and tending, in connection with proof of
other facts, to prove his guilt. People v. Crowl, 82 P. (2d) 507
(Cal. 1938) ; State v. Gibson, supra; Moore v. State, 220 Wis. 404,
265 N. W. 101 (1936).
An admission in criminal matters relates to matters of fact
not involving a criminal intent; a confession is an acknowledgement of guilt. It is only with respect to confessions that preliminary proof that they were voluntary must be made before
they are admissible in evidence. People v. Fowkes, 178 Cal. 657,
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174 Pac. 892 (1918). Accord: People v. Wynekoop, 339 Ill. 124,
194 N. E. 276 (1934) (writ of certiorari denied in 295 U. S. 758) ;
Commonwealth v. Jokinen, 257 Mass. 429, 154 N. E. 189 (1926);
State v. Kerns, 50 N. D. 927, 198 N. W. 698 (1924).
In the 16th and 17th centuriesthere was no restriction upon
reception of confessions. Technically, a confession was a plea of
guilty' dealing with a matter of criminal pleading, not evidence.
In the 1700s some confessions were rejected as untrustworthy,
and were thought of as the "highest evidence of guilt." In the
1800s the principle of exclusion was developed to an abnormal extent, and exclusion became the rule and admission the exception.
This is the rule today. What the future rule will be is problematical. 2 Wigmore, Evidence (2d. ed. 1923) sec. 817-820.
In twelve states the rule prevailing is that the question of
whether a confession is voluntary is one of the admissibility of
evidence and is addressed solely to the court. State v. Kerns,
supra. Notes (1933) 85 A. L. R. 870. In other jurisdictions the
issue may be left to the jury under instructions to disregard the
confession unless it finds that it was made voluntarily. 20 Am.
Jur., Evidence, sec. 533. Notes (1933) A. L. R. 881. In still other
jurisdictions courts have failed to enunciate a clear-cut ruling
upon this point, preferring to let each case set its own pattern in
that respect. Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613 (1896).
Notes (1933) 85 A. L. R. 900. "The admissibility of the confession is a question for the judge, in accordance with the principle
defining the functions of judge and jury. This orthodox principle is well recognized in the majority of jurisdictions. But in
comparatively recent times the heresy of leaving the question
to the jury- has made rapid strides." 2 Wigmore, Evidence
(2d. ed. 1923) sec. 861.
Is there any justification in the distinction between admissions and confessions, requiring one mode of procedure to determine the voluntariness, and hence the admissibilty, of confessions and a different mode to determine the same questions
in regard to admissions? Is there more chance of injustice being
done in one case than in the other? The requirement of a preliminary examination has been said to go deeper than procedural
formality. As a confession is almost conclusive, a defendant who
has pleaded not guilty and gone to trial ought not be found to
have waived his objection as to the prima facie admissibility of
the alleged confession, or compelled to fight out his objections
and preserve his exceptions in the presence of the jury. Cohen
v. United States, 291 Fed. 366 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923). Notes (1936)
102 A. L. R. 605. But, are not the risks of testimonial untrustworthiness and encouragement of abusive police practices, which
probably is the reason for requiring a preliminary hearing before allowing a confession in evidence, nearly as great in the
case of an admission? 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1172; cf. State v. Garney,
45 Idaho 768, 265 Pac. 668 (1928); Commonwealth v. Haywood,
247 Mass. 16, 141 N. E. 571 (1923). "The only real danger in a
confession - the danger of a false statement - is of a slender
character.... The notion that the confession should be guarded

BAR BRIEFS
against is not a benefit to the innocent, but a detriment. A full
statement of the accused person's explanations, made at the earliest moment is often the best means for him to secure a speedy
vindication." 2 Wigmore, Evidence (2d. ed. 1923), sec. 867.
It is submitted that North Dakota should abolish the distinction between confessions and admissions in criminal cases and
require a preliminary examination as to voluntariness of any
statement that admits a part or all of a crime.
ALEX W. SKOROPAT.
TAKE NOTICE
Americanization and Citizenship Committee respectfully
directs your attention to the following recommendation contained
in the report of the 1939 Committee:
"That each attorney of this state take it on himself
to conduct and put on at least one patriotic program within his or her own county, on Constitution Day or week,
and at least one such program on Washington's or
Lincoln's day or week, in the county in which he or she
resides."
Anyone desiring to purchase a set of Corpus Juris in A-1
condition please write H. G. Nilles, Fargo, N. D.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In the Department of State Highways of the State of Worth Dakota, and
J. S.
nb, as State Highway Commissioner and the officer in charge of
said Department, Petrs. and Ayplts., vs. Berta E. Baker, as State Auditor
of the State of North ,Dakota, and John Omland, as State Treasurer of the
State of North Dakota, Respts.
That a subordinate ministerial officer to whom no injury can result and
to whom no violation of duty can be imputed by reason of compliance with
the statute, may not question the constitutionality of the statute imposing
such duty.
That under the circumstances in this case wherein it appears that the
state auditor is a constitutional officer against whom a proceeding is brought
to compel her to disburse public funds under a statute which the attorney
general, who is her legal adviser and Is also a constitutional officer, has advised is unconstitutional, and the question of constitutionality is of great
public importance, affecting many people, the public revenue of the state
and one of the major departments of the state government, It is held that the
state auditor may question the constitutionality of the statute upon which
the proceedings are based.
That Chapter 170, Session Laws 1939 does not amend or change any other
statute either directly or by implication.
That Section 64 of the Constitution was not intended to require the reenactment and pupblication at length of all definitions that might be employed in the construction of the law. Reference to other statutes may be
made to determine the meaning of terms used as an aid in determining legislative intent.
That where a statute levies a tax, -provides for ascertaining the amount
to be paid, and determines where the proceeds shall go, the failure to make
specific provisions for detailed procedure of collection of the tax does not
render the statute violative of Section 64 of the Constitution.

